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Note: Federal Income Tax Treatment of Business
and Employment Investigatory Expenses
I. INTRODUCTION
Almost every taxpayer at one time or another investigates
the possibility of entering a new business, new employment or
some like endeavor. In so doing he incurs so-called "investiga-
tory expenses"--travel expenses in search of a job, costs of news-
paper advertising, employment agency fees, costs of economic
surveys or reports on a prospective business acquisition and
other expenditures made prior to the time at which a decision
is made to undertake income-producing activity.1
Until recently, the Internal Revenue Code's scheme to per-
mit deductions of expenses and losses incurred in connection
with income-producing activity has not been interpreted to al-
low the deduction of investigatory expenses. The Congressional
purpose in allowing expense deductions under Section 162 or
Section 212 is to ensure that a taxpayer is taxed only on net in-
come and not on the cost of producing income.2  Accordingly,
courts have found it difficult to place investigatory expenses in
the category of Section 162 business or Section 212 nonbusiness
expenses since investigatory expenses are only remotely of bene-
fit in the creation of goods and services which produce income,
unlike, for instance, the salary costs of an established business
or the upkeep costs of rental apartments which are of direct
1. The fact that these outlays are incurred prior to such a decision
distinguishes them from other preliminary expenses which might be
loosely termed "pre-operating expenses," i.e., legal fees expended in
attempting to acquire a business license or costs of hiring and train-
ing personnel in preparation for eventual business activity.
Pre-operating expenses are often closely linked to the acquisition of
a particular asset of the prospective business or investment. They are
generally capitalized. See Mandell, Deductibility of Pre-Operating Ex-
penses: Successful and Unsuccessful Ventures, N.Y.U. 25TH INST. oN
Fms. TAX. 1235, 1236-47 (1967). See generally T. Firus & H. Knn'KE,
ACCOUNTING FOR BusINESS LAwYERs 175-95 (1971). See also text ac-
companying notes 27-29 infra.
2. See J. CHOMnIE, FDERAL Iicoim TAxATioN 67 (1968); R. GooDE,
THE ID-vnmuA INcoNm TAX 76, 99 (1964). The requirement that only
net income be taxed may be a constitutional mandate. B. BriT=r,
FEDERAsL INcoZm, ESTATE xAN GI TAXATI N 71 (3d ed. 1964). However,
a tax on gross income without the allowance of deductions might be
considered an "excise" and thus constitutional. See Spreckels Sugar
Refining Co. v. McClain, 192 U.S. 397 (1904); B. BrrrKm, supra, at
71-75.
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benefit.3 Similarly, it is difficult to allow a loss deduction of
investigatory outlays since the conventional concept of loss ne-
cessarily involves an involuntary deprivation. 4 It is also trouble-
some to categorize them as nondeductible capital outlays (which
might allow an addition to basis of a subsequently acquired as-
set and possibly a gradual depreciation recoupment) since the
criterion for capitalization is long-term benefit to income-pro-
ducing activity similar to the short-term benefit of an ordinary
business or nonbusiness expense.5 Since an investigatory ex-
pense is of remote benefit to current creation of income, it is no
less remotely benefical to such production over a longer period.,
In addition to these broad conceptual objections to the de-
duction of investigatory costs, courts are faced with the lan-
guage restrictions of the specific deduction provisions. 7 The
reading the courts have given these provisions as they are ap-
plied to investigatory expenses is best exemplified by the Tax
3. However, it would not seem completely unreasonable to
characterize investigatory outlays as business expenses since they ap-
pear to be an essential precursor to any subsequent earning activity
conducted by the taxpayer. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 162 [hereinafter
cited as IRC] allows a business expense deduction for "ordinary and
necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying
on any trade or business. .. ."
4. See generally 5 J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
§ 28.39, at 180-82 (rev. ed. 1966) [hereinafter cited as J. MERTENS].
However, the courts have not adhered strictly to this conventional the-
ory of the nature of loss. Although the core concept of loss may involve
some notion of involuntariness, it is clear that a loss may be deducted
in some cases even though incurred voluntarily. For example, the
amount by which expenses exceed gross income in a given year may
be deducted as a loss. However;, this broader concept does not help
investigating taxpayers since, as a technical matter, most courts find
that "entrance" into an investigation is not compliance with the Sec-
tion 165(c) (2) requirement for a loss that a transaction or trade or
business actually be entered. See, e.g., Morton Frank, 20 T.C. 511
(1953); IRC, § 165(c) (1) & (2).
5. See T. Fu's & H. KRIPKE, supra note 1, at 75; 4A J. MERTENS,
supra note 4, at § 25.20.
6. However, investigatory expenses are similar to the ordinary
capital outlay in that both are preliminary and incidental to the ac-
quisition of an asset or income-earning position. Some courts have
accordingly held that they are capital expenditures. See McDonald v.
Commissioner, 139 F.2d 400 (3rd Cir. 1943). However, the principle
was not relied upon by the Supreme Court in McDonald v. Commis-
sioner, 323 U.S. 57 (1944) in affirming the denial of the deduction of
the campaign expenditure. See also Dwight Ward, 20 T.C. 332 (1953),
aff'd, 224 F.2d 547 (9th Cir. 1965); 4A J. MERTENS, supra note 4, § 25.08
at 33.
7. It is often argued that deduction provisions are to be strictly
construed as a matter of statutory construction, since deductions are a
matter of "legislative grace." See J. CHOMMIE, supra note 2, at 67.
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Court opinion of Morton Frank.8 There the taxpayer, who had
been in the newspaper business prior to service in the armed
forces, began traveling to various cities investigating the pur-
chase of a newspaper business upon his release. His search con-
tinued for approximately one year, six months of which he was
employed by a newspaper while investigating newspaper busi-
ness opportunities in his free time. Expenses were incurred for
travel, communication and legal services. In several cities offers
to purchase various properties were made and rejected. A news-
paper was finally purchased and operated in Canton, Ohio.
The taxpayer argued for a deduction under three Code
provisions. He maintained that a deduction should be allowed
either as a business expense under the predecessor of Section
162, as a nonbusiness expense under the predecessor of Section
212 or as a loss resulting from an abandoned "transaction en-
tered into for profit" under the predecessor of Section 165 (c) (2).
The court denied the Section 162 business expense deduction
since the statutory language required that the expenditures be
incurred "in carrying on a trade or business," which does not
permit deduction of preliminary expenditures. 0 Similarly, Sec-
tion 212 nonbusiness expense treatment was denied, although
the language of the provision allowed deductions for ordinary
and necessary expenses incurred "for the production or collec-
tion of income."" The court held that the taxpayer failed to
show an existing interest in some ongoing enterprise or invest-
ment at the time the expense was incurred.
The expenditures were not a Section 165(c) (2) loss deduc-
tion since the only transaction entered into was the purchase
of the newspaper in Canton. The fruitless investigations in
other cities, the court felt, were not transactions but were
merely preliminary thereto. Even if the entire search were to
be regarded as one transaction, there could be no loss at the
time the newspaper was acquired, since such acquisition was
8. 20 T.C. 511 (1953).
9. This language appears in identical form in INT. REv. CODE
of 1939, § 23 (a) (1) and IRC, § 162 (a).
10. The further language in the same section of the Code that
travel expenses could be deducted if incurred "while away from
home in the pursuit of business" did not help petitioner for two reasons.
First, the Court found that the words "in pursuit of" presuppose an
existing business with which the taxpayer is connected. Second, the
taxpayer had not established a "home" within the meaning of the
statute and thus could have no expenses "while away from home."
20 T.C. at 513-14 (1953).
11. IRC, § 212(1).
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merely the continuation of the transaction. Since there was no
abandonment of that transaction there could be no loss deduc-
tion.12
II. BUSINESS OR NONBUSINESS EXPENSE
DEDUCTION UNDER SECTION 162 OR SECTION 212
A. Two THRESHOLD PROBLEMS CONCERNING THE DEDUCTIBILITY OF
INVESTIGATORY EXPENSES: THE NET INCOME CONCEPT AND THE
PROHIBITION OF THE DEDUCTION OF PERSONAL EXPENSES
Although the theoretical reason for allowing expense deduc-
tions is to reduce a gross income stream down into a taxable net
income, Congress, the courts, and the Internal Revenue Service
have not strictly required a particular or even an existing in-
come stream as a prerequisite to the deduction of expenses. For
example, it is evident that the deductibility of an expense is
not contingent on the success of the profit-making activity to
which it relates. Treasury Regulation § 1.162-1(a) 13 states that
business expenses otherwise deductible are not rendered non-
deductible by the fact that they exceed the gross income de-
rived from the particular activity during the taxable year. The
taxpayer is permitted to deduct from his entire income for the
year. Furthermore, the taxpayer who has income from no other
sources is relieved by the provisions for net operating loss carry-
12. The Court explicitly refused to deal with the issue of capitali-
zation since it was not raised by the litigants. 20 T.C. at 514. It is
possible that, had it been raised, the Court would have found that the
investigatory expenditure could be capitalized in the business which
the taxpayer ultimately acquired. This could imply any of several tax
consequences. Most likely it would mean a separate ordinary or capi-
tal loss at the sale or other disposition of the business. However, it
could also mean an allocation of the investigatory costs to various assets
of the business which would allow gradual recoupment if some of
those assets were depreciable and would be part of the basis of each
type of asset. Therefore, if and when the business were sold, there would
likely be an offset to both ordinary and capital gain. See Williams v.
McGowan, 152 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1945).
An alternative to proportional allocation of the investigatory ex-
pense among the assets would be to add all of it to the basis of good
will in which case it would be an offset to capital gain or would increase
capital loss. The similarity of investigatory expenses to a purchase of
good will was pointed out in George Westervelt, 8 T.C. 1248 (1947)
(expenses of investigating various aspects of the cattle business prior to
engagement therein held to be capital expenditures).
As for the possibility of an ordinary loss deduction, see Roy
Harding, 29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 789 (1970) (taxpayer not allowed an
ordinary loss deduction for exploratory expenses on a Subchapter S
passthrough; no abandonment of the land acquisition venture shown).
13. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-1(a) (1960).
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converted to investment purposes, even though his attempts are
unsuccessful and no rental income is derived from the prop-
erty.19
These authorities indicate that although a taxpayer's ex-
penditures must bear some relationship to activity from which
he expects to derive income, for the purpose of an expense de-
duction no showing of a direct link with actual income inflow is
required. Thus, a deduction for investigatory expenses would
not be inconsistent with the net income concept as it has been
liberally construed.
Just as the remoteness of investigatory expenses from the
income stream might have prevented their deduction in the past
on account of the net incorfie concept, it has also led some
courts to classify them as personal expenses, 20 generally nonde-
ductible under the Code.21  One step removed from income-
producing activity, investigatory expenses arguably are similar
to such nondeductible items as preparatory educational expenses
and commuting expenses. However, commuting expenses would
seem to be more clearly personal in nature since they are a re-
sult of the taxpayer's choice of personal residence. Similarly,
educational expenses presumably result in broad benefits to the
taxpayer unrelated to his profit-making capability. Investiga-
tory expenses, by contrast, do not result in, and are not aimed
at, anything other than a profit-making goal.
A recent Tax Court case has rejected the ideas that investi-
gatory expenses should be nondeductible either because they are
not closely related to the income stream or because they are of
a significantly personal nature. In David Primuth22 a deduction
was allowed for an employment agency fee which resulted in the
taxpayer procuring a new job similar to the one held when the
fee was paid. The deduction was allowed from taxable income
in the year in which he received income only from the old job.
19. See William C. Horrmann, 17 T.C. 903 (1951); Mary Robin-
son, 2 T.C. 305 (1943). But see Warren Leslie, Sr., 6 T.C. 489 (1946).
The courts have imposed a higher burden on the taxpayer to show
conversion to profit-seeking purposes in order to get a partial loss de-
duction on the sale of such property. As a result, various nonbusiness
expense deductions may be allowed for the property over a period, but
when the taxpayer sells the property and attempts to take a loss de-
duction it very likely may be disallowed. See, e.g., William C. Horr-
mann, 17 T.C. 903 (1951).
20. See, e.g., Leon Chooluck, 13 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 864 (1954);
Raymond L. Collier, 13 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 857 (1954).
21. IRC, § 262.
22. 54 T.C. 374 (1970).
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overs and carrybacks 1 4 which allow the excess business expense
over income for the present year to offset income from any in-
come-producing activities in other taxable years.
There is also authority under Section 212 that expense de-
ductions will be allowed even though no income at all is de-
rived from an interest or investment. The House Committee
Report states that expenses are deductible under Section 212
even though "there is no likelihood that the property will be
sold at a profit or will otherwise be productive of income."' 15
A regulation 6 under Section 212 states that expenses incurred
in connection with bonds or rental property held with the ex-
pectation of producing income are deductible despite the fact
that no income is realized in the taxable year. This principle
allows, for example, a deduction for the cost of a safety deposit
box containing defaulted bonds, or for the upkeep of a con-
demned house held for rent, neither of which have any prospect
of income production.
There is also case law which supports the idea that there
need be no income inflow. A business expense deduction un-
der Section 162 has been allowed' 7 where the taxpayer printed
and distributed religious handbills which advertised an idiosyn-
cratic prophetic book which had no likelihood of being sold, on
the ground that the taxpayer did not engage in the activity for
pleasure but had a profit-making purpose, however unreasona-
ble. The Tax Court has allowed' s the Section 162 deduction
of the business entertainment expenses of an unemployed sales-
man who had no sales income in the taxable year, but who was
actively seeking another position where he would serve the same
customers. Where a taxpayer has attempted to rent out his
house after abandoning it as a personal residence, the Tax Court
has allowed him to deduct the expenses of maintenance and
depreciation under Section 212 on the ground that it has been
14. IRC, § 172. Section 172(c) provides that the net operating
loss, which can be applied to prior or subsequent taxable years, in-
cludes any deduction given by "this chapter," with certain exceptions,
one of which is the nonbusiness expense deduction of Section 212.
15. H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 74-75 (1942).
16. Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(b) (1957). See generally Lykes v.
United States, 343 U.S. 118, 125 (1952); Daniel Kelly, 23 T.C. 682 (1955);
Stella Tyler, 6 T.C. 135 (1946).
17. Doggett v. Burnet, 65 F.2d 191 (D.C. Cir. 1933). See L.W.
Brooks, Jr., 50 T.C. 927, 932-33 (1968).
18. Harold Haft, 40 T.C. 2 (1963). See Furner v. Commissioner,
393 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1968) (teacher who took a year off to secure a
master's degree allowed a deduction for cost of courses).
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The taxpayer did not begin work in the new job until the sub-
sequent tax year.23 The court also made a finding that the em-
ployment agency fee was not a personal expenditure since it
had an exclusive and direct relationship to profit seeking and
the potential receipt of income.2 4 Thus it would appear that the
Tax Court does not consider either the net income concept or
the nondeductibility of personal expenses to be an impasse to
investigatory expense deductions.
B. TRADE OR BusINEsS EXPENSE DEDUCTION UNDER SECTION 162
In addition to the implicit rejection of a strict net income
concept and a finding that the employment fee was not per-
sonal in nature, the Primuth Court, in order to allow Section 162
deduction, had to overcome barriers which in the past had been
built on a narrow reading of the statutory language. To under-
stand fully how the Court broke through these barriers to de-
velop explicitly a novel concept of what constitutes a "trade or
business" under Section 162, a thorough examination of the
traditional view and its history is required.
1. The Strict View of Time of Entrance Into a Trade or Business
In order to qualify for the Section 162 deduction, a taxpayer
must be pursuing a "trade or business." To meet this test he
traditionally has been required at least to show that he has en-
tered and is pursuing an ongoing activity at the time the ex-
penses are incurred.25 The determination of the time of entrance
23. Id. at 375-77.
24. Id. at 381.
25. See 4A J. AMERTENS § 25.08. IRC § 162 (a) states that a deduction
is allowed for "ordinary and necessary" expenses incurred "in carrying
on any trade or business." There is no definitive statement of the type of
activity that constitutes such an ongoing business under Section 162. It
has been held that at a minimum the activity must be something more
than a single transaction entered into with the expectation of profit.
Stanton v. Commissioner, 399 F.2d 326 (5th Cir. 1968); Industrial Re-
search Products, 40 T.C. 578 (1963). The Third and Sixth Circuits re-
quire that there be extensive or repeated activity over a substantial
period of time. McDowell v. Ribicoff, 292 F.2d 174 (3rd Cir. 1961);
Wright v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 1264, affd, 274 F.2d 883 (6th Cir. 1960).
In Stanton the taxpayer had engaged in sporadic inventing in the
past and sought deductions for the expenses of designing and making
a model of a storm-proof boat. The court stated that he had not been
active with sufficient "continuity or regularity" to justify a finding that
he was engaged in a trade or business. 399 F.2d at 330. The court
did not clearly define the test, and the reluctance of the court to do so
is indicative of the troublesome lack of guidelines in this area.
1972] 1163
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into this continuing activity is critical for a taxpayer incurring
preliminary expenses generally. All expenditures incurred
prior to this time will be deemed nondeductible, despite the fact
that they are of current benefit only and hence not capital in
nature.
26
At least where a sole proprietorship or corporation is con-
cerned, the courts have been restrictive in the determination of
when the requisite activity is begun. In Richmond Television
v. United States,27 the court held that although there had been
an incorporation, there could be no business expense deduction
of salaries until the activities for which the enterprise had been
organized actually were begun. The court emphasized that the
corporate taxpayer had not yet obtained an FCC license, nor
acquired facilities for broadcasting. It is not clear from the
opinion whether the court would have considered the acquisition
of assets or the beginning of operations as the critical point at
which the taxpayer would have entered the trade or business,
since all the expenses at issue were incurred before either
event.28 But either test would appear to rule out the deduction
See also Deputy v. DuPont, 308 U.S. 488 (1940), where Justice
Frankfurter, in a concurring opinion, originally asserted the definition of
a trade or business in terms of the taxpayer holding himself out to
others as being in a particular enterprise.
Although Section 162, and many other of the sections of the Code
which use the trade or business term, do not specifically define it some
guidelines are offered in a few of the Code sections. Some guidelines
for what is not a trade or business are given in Section 183 which pre-
vents favorable tax treatment for activities not engaged in for profit.
Sections 355 (distributions of a controlled corporation) and 346
(partial liquidation of a corporation) provide favorable tax treatment
in certain circumstances if a corporation distributes the assets or pro-
ceeds from the sale of a "trade or business." The definition of the term
for both provisions is set forth in Treas. Reg. § 1.355-1 (c) (1955). The
"trade or business" is defined as "a specific existing group of activities
being carried on for the purpose of earning income or profit .... Such
group of activities ordinarily must include the collection of income and
the payment of expenses."
See generally 4A J. MERTENS, supra note 4, § 25.08 at 28, where it
is stated that the trade or business term is "one of the most decep-
tively simple phrases" used in the Tax Code.
26. Id. at 32-33.
27. 345 F.2d 901 (4th Cir. 1965).
28. In Petersburg Television Corp. v. Commissioner, 20 CCH Tax
Ct. Mem. 271 (1961), the court stressed acquisition of the FCC license
as determinative. See also, Cohn v. United States, 57-1 CCH U.S.T.C.
9457 (W.D. Tenn. 1957), where it was held that the taxpayer could
not deduct expenses incurred prior to the actual opening day of the pilot
training school.
A possible definition of entrance into business activity is found in
the regulations for IRC § 248 which gives the taxpayer an election to
1164 [Vol. 56:1157
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of investigatory expenses, since both events would likely occur
at the end of any investigation and the beginning of a commit-
ment to a particular income-producing activity.
For those who are not investigating an enterprise, i.e., em-
ployees, professionals or office-holders, it would appear that in
most cases there is no entrance into the trade or business until
actual work activity is begun. Even if the signing of an employ-
ment contract, the election to office or some similar occurrence
would suffice to trigger trade or business entrance, it is clear
that any investigatory expenditures which preceded that point
in time would be nondeductible.2 9
2. Evolution of the Trade or Business Concept
The "trade or business" of a taxpayer for Section 162 pur-
poses traditionally has been loosely associated with the particu-
lar job or income-earning position of the taxpayer.30 Recently
the idea of what constitutes a "trade or business" has been broad-
ened in three distinct ways. The first development, which may
appropriately be labeled "expansion" of the trade or business
concept, is peculiar to investigatory expense situations. The situ-
ation arises when a taxpayer incurs expenses to explore the pos-
sibility of entering an activity which the court finds is closely
amortize organizational expenses. The purpose of the definition is
to determine when the 60 month amortization period begins, before
which time the taxpayer must make the election. Treas. Reg. § 1.248-
1(a) (3) (1956) states that the corporation begins business when it starts
the business operations for which it was organized or when activities
have advanced to the extent necessary to establish the nature of its
business operations. An example is given which indicates that such
test is met when the operating assets necessary to the enterprise are
acquired.
For a discussion of the restrictive view of the courts as to when a
business is entered and the manner in which that view has been ap-
plied to deny the expense deduction to pre-operating expenditures
which are not capital in nature, see Mandel, supra note 1, at 1235;
Waters, Sideline Ventures: Planning to Achieve Maximum Tax Ben-
efits From Losses Incurred, 29 J. or TAx. 100 (1968).
29. See 4A J. MsEREs, supra note 4, at § 25.08.
The usual employee expense deductions are for union dues or uni-
forms although entertainment expenses are allowed for salesmen. Em-
ployees also have been allowed to deduct the amount of defaulted loans
made to the employer as trade or business bad debts under Section 166
and thereby receive ordinary loss rather than capital loss treatment
See Weddle v. Commissioner, 325 F.2d 849 (2d Cir. 1963); Hirsch v.
Commissioner, 315 F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1963); Trent v. Commissioner,
291 F.2d 669 (2d Cir. 1961).
30. See, e.g., John F. Koons, 35 T.C. 1092 (1961); George C. Wester-
velt, 8 T.C. 1248 (1947).
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akin to the type of activity he is undertaking in his current job
or position. The court "expands" the taxpayer's trade or busi-
ness to allow the deduction on the basis that the activity ex-
plored will be an appendage to his existing income-earning
activity, and not an entirely new trade or business. "Expand-
ing" the trade or business of a taxpayer might be exemplified
by the allowance of a deduction for a dealer in domestic auto-
mobiles who explores the possibility of acquiring a franchise on
foreign cars, or investigates a possible car servicing business. 3 1
The second development, which might be labelled "exten-
sion", is not peculiar to investigatory expense situations and in-
deed, first appeared in cases where taxpayers claimed deductions
of outlays for business entertainment and educational expenses.
3 2
A court, in "extending" the taxpayer's trade or business, allows
the taxpayer to deduct expenses even though he has ceased
gainful activity in a particular job or position, when it appears
that the taxpayer will continue identical or at least closely sim-
ilar activity within a reasonable time. For example, a court
might "extend" a salesman's trade or business to allow the de-
duction of expenses for the entertainment of his clients during
a short period after he has ceased gainful activity as an em-
ployed salesman.
Both of these developments have influenced the third and
most recent development of the Primuth case and its progeny.
33
Under these decisions, a taxpayer's trade or business is detached
or disassociated from any particular job or position and the tax-
payer is given what might be called a trade or business status
in the field in which he is generally employed. Under this view,
the expenses of investigating a job or position similar to one
held currently or in the recent past can be viewed as not in-
vestigatory in nature at all, but as expenses merely incidental to
his more abstract "trade or business" which subsumes the jobs
31. An excellent example of the Service "expanding" trade or
business standing is found in a regulation associated with Section 162.
Treas. Reg. 1.162-5 explains the types of educational expenses which
are allowed as deductions because they prepare the taxpayer for some
new activity not considered to be a new trade or business. It states
that a shift from elementary to secondary school teacher, from class-
room teacher in one subject to classroom teacher in another subject, or
from classroom teacher to guidance counselor is not a change to a
new trade or business. Hence the educational expenses which qualify
one for such a shift are not nondeductible.
32. See text accompanying notes 40-49 infra.
33. See text accompanying notes 51-57 infra.
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or positions investigated as well as the one currently or recently
held. This trade or business status would seem then, to repre-
sent a field of activity in which the taxpayer has background
and experience and where he will probably continue to earn
his living in the future.3 4
a. Pre-Primuth Expansion of the Trade or Business
In J.W. York v. Commissioner,"5 the taxpayer was in the
business of promoting and developing shopping centers and res-
idential areas. Intending to begin the development of industrial
real estate as well, he spent money for an economic survey of the
industrial potential of certain lands but thereafter abandoned
the exploration. The Tax Court held that the expenditures
were preparatory to entering a new venture and thus were not
deductible under either Section 162 (citing Frank) or Section
212. The Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that the new venture
was not a new line of business. The court felt that the venture
would not have been a new pursuit, but was part of his general
occupation in real estate development. This result was reached
despite the fact that since the taxpayer never entered the new
line of activity, there was no income resulting from the outlay
at all. Latent in such a result is a rejection of a strict applica-
tion of the net income concept as applied to investigatory ex-
penses.
In Cornelius Vanderbilt, Jr.,3 6 the taxpayer had been a long-
time author and lecturer. He incurred legal fees in negotiating
with advertising agencies and television networks in an effort
to become a narrator of a weekly television series. The Tax
Court in a memorandum decision rejected the Commissioner's
contention that the television field was separate from the field
of activity in which the taxpayer was engaged. The court found
the activity of narrating travel films on television to be so
closely similar to the activity of presenting lectures in person
34. This development has been facilitated by the great liberality
with which the net income concept has been viewed since the allow-
ance of deductions for a taxpayer who has such status will sometimes
not be immediately helpful in the production of income. But, as in
the case of the entertainment expense deduction during inactivity or
the expense of exploring a new job or position, the deductible outlay
can still be viewed as proximately related to future income though
sometimes only in the form of an expectation.
35. 261 F.2d 421 (4th Cir. 1958).
36. 16 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1081 (1957).
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on the subject of travel that the expenditures were an ordinary
and necessary expense of being an author-lecturer.8 7
However, in Joseph Sheban,88 another memorandum deci-
sion, the taxpayer was not allowed to deduct the expense of in-
vestigating the possible conversion of a hotel into a senior citi-
zen's home. The court felt that such an expense was not in-
tegral to the taxpayer's particular business of leasing and man-
aging real estate properties. The results in these two Tax Court
cases may be reconciled on the basis that the activities of au-
thor-lecturer and TV narrator on the same subjects are more
closely related than the activities of leasing real estate proper-
ties and running a senior citizen's home. Thus, the court's will-
ingness to expand the taxpayer's current job or position to in-
clude concurrent activities within his corresponding trade or
business seems to depend on an exceedingly close similarity of
the new activities to those already being performed. 9
37. Trade or business standing has been comparably but more com-
pletely expanded in interpretations of Section 174 which allows the
taxpayer a deduction of research and experimental expenditures in-
curred "in connection with his trade or business." Originally the courts
adopted a restrictive view similar to that first taken under Section
162. In John F. Koons, 35 T.C. 1092 (1961), a partner in an advertising
agency who also spent time promoting and investigating various enter-
prises and who had had prior interests in promoting various totally
unrelated products could not deduct the expenses of developing and
promoting a "titinium suboxide rectifier" which never got into pro-
duction. But in Best Universal Lock Co., 45 T.C. 1 (1965), a Section
174 deduction was allowed for development work on an isothermal air
compressor. In the past the company had specialized almost exclu-
sively in lock systems for industrial concerns. The Tax Court empha-
sized evidence which indicated that the taxpayer fully intended to put
the new idea into production at the time the expenses were incurred.
The Service has accepted the Best approach in Rev. Rul. 71-162,
1971 INT. REv. BuiL. No. 13, at 12. There the case is cited in ruling
that the expenses to develop new products or processes, though unre-
lated to current product lines or manufacturing processes of the trade
or business, are deductible if incurred "in connection with" the enter-
prise.
Although the language and purpose of Section 174 are different from
that of Section 162 and apparently more conducive to expansion of the
trade or business concept than Section 162, it is possible that the broad
developments under Section 174 will have some effect on the develop-
ment of the Section 162 trade or business concept.
38. 29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 727 (1970). See also Paul Seguin, 26
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 950 (1967), where a taxpayer who retailed clothes,
cards, cosmetics and other sundries could not deduct expenses of in-
vestigations in France of possible perfume importing and other ven-
tures. There was a personal aspect to the trip since the taxpayer visited
his sister.
39. There are other arguments a taxpayer can make concerning
expenditures in connection with a field of activity totally unrelated to
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b. Pre-Primuth Extension of the Trade or Business Concept
The progenitor case in extending a taxpayer's trade or busi-
ness is the Harold Haft decision.40 There an unemployed sales-
man who actively sought sales positions for some time after
leaving his old job was allowed an expense deduction for culti-
vating customers by taking them to dinner, to the theater and
by giving them gifts. The court reasoned that since the tax-
payer was actively seeking another sales job or position during
the period, and he expected ultimately to serve the same custo-
mers, his carrying on of a trade or business should not be found
to have terminated at the time he left the sales job. The court
one in which he is already involved.
The deduction may be allowed if the Court can be convinced that
the expenditure was made to protect or promote the taxpayer's busi-
ness. In Cubbedge Snow, 31 T.C. 585 (1958), a law partnership or-
ganized a savings and loan association and agreed to guarantee its defi-
cits for a period of three years. Prior to the advance, the law part-
ners had a title opinion business which had declined owing to the lack
of local money lenders to stimulate the purchase of real estate. The
court found that advances made pursuant to the agreement were de-
ductible as an ordinary and necessary expense of the law business.
The court felt that the expenditures were made to protect or promote
the taxpayer's business rather than as an investment in a new enter-
prise.
But the more strained this argument becomes, as in cases where the
success of taxpayer's current business is not so closely dependent on
the new activity, the less likely the court will allow the deduction.
For example, it has been held that a lawyer may not deduct the ex-
penses of campaigning for public office even though it is shown that
such expenses increase the lawyer's business and are, in effect, for ad-
vertising. See James Arditto, 30 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 866 (1971);
William Maness, 54 T.C. 1602 (1970); Harry Moreland, 19 CCH Tax CL
Mem. 938 (1960) (alleged that campaign increased business).
If a taxpayer has had past limited activity in a field unrelated to
his current business he can argue that he is in a second trade or busi-
ness. This argument was successful in James Warren, 27 CCH Tax
CL Mem. 940 (1969), where the owner-operator of a telephone com-
pany, insurance agency and bank was permitted to deduct the ex-
penses of a fruitless trip to Florida to investigate the purchase of some
submarine cable for salvage. The court found that the taxpayer was in
the submarine cable salvage business since he had engaged in several
successful individual transactions of the same sort within the previous
four years. The court avoided a strict scrutiny of the earlier cable
operations which probably would not have passed the more rigorous
ongoing operations test of a trade or business. See note 25 supra. In
Nicholas Dodich, 30 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 248 (1971), a full-time lab
technician was permitted to deduct expenditures made to develop and
promote various devices, such as a muzzle break for a rifle, none of
which generated any income. In finding that the taxpayer was in a
second trade or business, the Court stressed its initial finding that the
activity was carried on with the bona fide purpose of realizing profit.
40. 40 T.C. 2 (1963).
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held that the taxpayer continued in the trade or business during
a reasonable transition period between jobs and a deduction was
allowed despite the lack of sales income during the jobless per-
iod.41 This special extension treatment seems justified in the
case of salesmen, since the customers for which entertainment
expenditures are made are often the same ones in both the
abandoned and the subsequent position.42
A slightly different issue arises when a taxpayer engaged
in a particular job is given leave to attend school temporarily.
For example, in Furner v. Commissioner,43 the Seventh Circuit
reversed the Tax Court and allowed a deduction for the educa-
tional and related expenses of a teacher who resigned from
teaching for a year in order to pursue graduate study. The ad-
ditional education was not required by her employer in order
for her to keep the job, but she herself felt it was necessary to
maintain competence in her teaching. The taxpayer subse-
quently returned to the same teaching job without obtaining
substantial advancement. The court noted that even though
the taxpayer had totally discontinued her teaching activity dur-
ing the period, there remained a sufficient relationship between
the year of study and the taxpayer's intended future perform-
ance in the teaching position to justify the deduction. The year
of study was considered a normal incident to carrying on the
business of teaching.44 In Peter Corbett,45 however, the Tax
41. Although Haft subsequently did acquire a sales business and
anticipated soliciting the entertained customers in connection with the
new business, the court did not place reliance on this relationship
with income flow. The court explicity distinguished the facts before it
from the investigatory expense situation and in fact specifically de-
nied a deduction for the expenses of a trip to Florida which had
allegedly been made for the purpose of investigating a sales business.
Id. at 6, 7. However, the disallowance may have rested on a sus-
pected personal pleasure aspect of the trip and the taxpayer's ad-
mission that he investigated ventures other than those related to sales.
42. A broader application of the principle to taxpayers incurring
other types of expenses is possibly suggested by the Court's comparison
of the entertainment outlay to an unemployed worker's payment of
union dues. Id. at 6.
43. 393 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1968), reversing 47 T.C. 165 (1966).
44. 393 F.2d at 295. The Service has acquiesced in Furner only to
the extent that it allows the deduction of expenses of maintaining or
improving skills when the taxpayer "temporarily ceases to engage ac-
tively in employment or other trade or business." Rev. Rul. 68-591,
1968-2 CuM. BULL. 73. Ordinarily, the temporary period must be a year
or less. It rejects an interpretation of Furner that the expenses are
incurred while carrying on a trade or business simply because they are
incident to a trade or business which the taxpayer intends to resume.
45. 55 T.C. 884 (1971).
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Court distinguished Furner and disallowed a former teacher the
deduction of education expenses. The taxpayer had resigned
her teaching position, allegedly because she wanted to begin
study leading to a Ph.D., but also because she was required to
care for a young child. Soon after the resignation she took
temporary jobs not connected with teaching but kept in contact
with the profession through membership in a professional so-
ciety. Although the taxpayer continued to solicit offers to col-
leges and through placement services, the court felt that these
activities had not been undertaken seriously. It stressed the
child as a present hinderance to her work activities and ques-
tioned her motivation to continue teaching since the child ap-
parently had caused her to resign in the first place. It also was
significant that she had not worked as a teacher for four years.4"
The Corbett Court cited the Canter case,47 which held that a
nurse who quit her job for four years to get a bachelor's degree
could not deduct the educational expenses because they did not
relate to nursing.4 s
Thus the Tax Court has firmly accepted the idea of exten-
sion but apparently will use it only if the jobless period during
which deductions are allowed is relatively short, and there are
reasonable assurances that the taxpayer will take a job or posi-
tion in the future similar to the one given up. In conceptual
terms it is the taxpayer's old trade or business which is being
extended. However, the court in Corbett, and to some extent
in Haft and Furner, found it necessary to closely examine con-
46. In disallowing the deduction the court cited Henry Owen, 23
T.C. 377 (1954), where a deduction was disallowed for the expense of
upkeep of a law office in North Dakota. The taxpayer had been a
governmental employee in Washington for 10 years since leaving North
Dakota. The Owen court held that there was no surviving law busi-
ness status since the taxpayer had taken an unrelated job and that the
expenses were merely "preparatory" to resuming the law business.
47. Canter v. United States, 354 F.2d 352 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
48. See Kaufman v. United States, 233 F. Supp. 123 (E.D. Pa. 1964)
(taxpayer who had been engaged in manufacturing could not deduct
expenses to secure readmission to the bar after he had been disbarred
16 years earlier). But see Elliot v. United States, 250 F. Supp. 322
(W.D.N.Y. 1965) (taxpayer allowed to deduct the cost of harp lessons
under Section 162 and depreciation on the harp under Section 167 when
3he maintained that they were preparatory to resuming her career as
a professional harpist which had been interrupted for a period of
years).
See also Paul Seguin, 26 CCH Tax Ct. Men. 950 (1967), where the
taxpayer who had not been in the perfume business for 14 years was




duct of the taxpayer which might indicate his motivation to
procure a future job or position. This suggests that underlying
the extension concept is the notion that the taxpayer's expend-
itures must have been intended to produce future income. It
is the anomaly of the extension cases that although it is the
taxpayer's past trade or business as extended which gives rise
to the deduction, it is his expectation of future income which
controls whether he will be allowed that deduction.49 It was
only in Primuth that the Tax Court recognized this anomaly
and resolved it.
c. Primuth and its Progeny
Although neither Haft nor Furner suggest that a taxpayer's
trade or business could be extended to allow the deduction of
investigatory expenses, 50 both cases were relied on in David
Primuth5' to do so while developing a more abstract concept of
a trade or business. In that case, a deduction was allowed to
an executive who paid an employment agency fee in connection
with his search for a new job with a different company. The
court reasoned that although both Haft and Furner involved
expenses related to the taxpayer's current or former employ-
ment, the essential principle was that an employee can tempor-
arily retain the status of pursuing a trade or business even
though he is not receiving any compensation from a particular
employer. Latent in this principle was the idea that the "trade
or business" of Section 162 is a more generalized concept, not
requiring a specific income-producing position.52 A taxpayer's
49. In the recent opinion of Don Cornish, 29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
235 (1970), the court examined the motive of a former physicist to
determine whether he intended a temporary sojourn to improve his
skills or was pursuing educational aspirations of a personal nature.
The Court said that the fact situation was more like Canter and
Owen than Haft or Furner and disallowed the deduction.
50. The Court in Haft actually denied the deduction of investiga-
tory expenses incurred by the unemployed salesman for a trip to Florida
allegedly to investigate business and employment interests. 40 T.C.
at 6, 7. See note 41 supra.
51. 54 T.C. 374 (1970).
52. The deduction of investigatory expenses in general has fre-
quently been denied in the past on a finding that they are either per-
sonal or capital expenditures. See, e.g., Leon Chooluck, 13 CCH Tax
Ct. Mem. 864 (1954); George Westervelt, 8 T.C. 1248 (1947). Such
findings are apparently also the basis for the broad prohibition of the
deduction of many types of investigatory expenses found in Treas. Reg.
1.212-1 (f) (1957). Thus the Tax Court was compelled to confront the
issue of whether investigatory expenses were personal or capital before
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trade or business status is a type of activity determined appar-
ently by his training and past income-producing experience with
which he will be somehow connected continuously. His status
will continue despite the change of jobs or positions within
that field, and despite the fact that there are periods in between
which no income is generated. Once this idea is accepted it is
a short step, if it is any step at all, to the simple proposition
accepted in Primuth that expenditures incurred in making
change to a new job or position within the field should not be
viewed conceptually as "investigatory" at all, since a new trade
or business is not being entered. Rather, the expenditures
represent ordinary and necessary expenses incidental to the tax-
payer's abstract "trade or business" which is uninterrupted by
the change of jobs.
In Primuth the taxpayer actually did procure a new job as
a result of the expenditure, and thus the court did not need to
consider whether the expense would be deductible had the in-
vestigation been fruitless. However, a subsequent case has
found the Primuth rationale appropriate to such situations.5 3
it allowed the deduction under Section 162. The court found that the
expense had no personal overtones because it did not lead to a dif-
ferent employment position than the one relinquished, nor did it
lead to what could be considered a personal asset or personal en-joyment. Similarly, it was not capital because no capital asset had
been purchased. 54 T.C. at 279-81.
53. There were two other decisions which followed Primuth and
foreshadowed the ultimate extension of the employment fee deduction
rationale of that case to fees from which no job resulted. In Dale
Huber, 29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 958 (1970) the employed taxpayer used a
resume prepared by an employment agency when he interviewed with
the new employer, but did most of the work to procure the new job
himself. The court found that the employment agency had materially
assisted the taxpayer in acquiring his job, though it is apparent that the
bulk of the fee was expended for the agency's fruitless efforts and
only a small part of the fee was even indirectly instrumental in pro-
curing a job for the taxpayer. The court tenuously distinguished a
pre-Primuth Ninth Circuit decision, Morris v. Commissioner, 423 F.2d
611 (9th Cir. 1970), which had disallowed a similar expenditure on a
finding that it had in no way helped the taxpayer procure the newjob. See Tucker, An Individuals Employment-Seeking Expenses: Ana-
lyzing the New Judicial Climate, 34 J. OF TAXATION 352 (1971).
In Kenneth Kenfield, 54 T.C. 1197 (1970), the taxpayer made an
agency fee expenditure which produced a new job, but then did not
take the proferred job when his current employer promoted him and
increased his salary. The court allowed the deduction on the ground
that the promotion was a result of the employment fee, but it is clear
that the more substantial causative factor was merely the threat of
his leaving the job which might have happened even if the taxpayer
had not procured the new job through the employment fee. Thus the
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In Leonard Cremona,54 the Tax Court was faced with an em-
ployed "administrator" who claimed a deduction for an employ-
ment counselling fee incurred in seeking new employment which
he never obtained. The court refused to recognize a difference
between an employment expenditure which because of economic
conditions or otherwise did not result in a new employment
position and one which did. The court found that the taxpayer
had "in good faith engaged the services [of the job counseling
service] . . . in order to improve his job opportunities" in the
trade or business of "administrator.)5 5
The effect of extension, expansion, and the Primuth-Cre-
mona principle is shown in the recent memorandum decision of
Walter Hendrix.50 In Hendrix, a Section 162 deduction was al-
lowed for expenses of exploring, on a trip to Europe, the possi-
bility of setting up a sales business. The taxpayer, who had
been an employee salesman of pharmaceuticals and over-the-
counter items, intended to sell home decorative items to the
same customers in a new business of his own. The idea was
abandoned before any income was realized and he did not re-
turn to his former employment. 57 The Tax Court expressly re-
fused to follow Frank, and stated that Haft was controlling. In
so doing the court read Haft on its broadest grounds to mean
that, despite the termination of his income producing position,
the taxpayer's status of "salesman" continued for tax purposes.
Hendrix is significant in some additional respects. First, instead
of selling pharmaceuticals and over-the-counter items, the tax-
payer was planning, at least at the outset, to market home decor-
agency fee appears remote as a causative factor. The job search can
be viewed fruitless in the sense that it did not result in what it was
intended to produce, namely, a new job taken by the taxpayer.
54. 58 T.C. No. 20 (May 4, 1972) (as yet unpublished opinion).
55. As a result of Primuth, the Internal Revenue Service retreated
from its stance that in order for an agency fee to be deductible it must
be payable by the taxpayer only if the agency is successful in ob-
taining the job. In Rev. Rul. 71-308, 1971-2 CuM. BULL. 82, the Serv-
ice ruled that fees paid for psychological examination and employment
counseling were deductible even though not subject to such a con-
tingency. However, this ruling is based on the premise, subse-
quently denied in Cremona, that the fee would not be deductible if a
job were not procured as a result of the outlay.
56. 30 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 221 (1971).
57. The court found that much of the trip was for personal reasons,
and thus allocated only a small amount of the expenditures to deductible
business purposes. It is notable that the deduction might have alterna-
tively been allowed as a loss once the court found that the taxpayer
maintained his trade or business status. Section 165(c) (1) allows all
losses incurred in the taxpayer's trade or business.
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ative items. The court thus expanded the taxpayer's trade or
business. Second, as in Cremona, the job investigation was fruit-
less, resulting in no sales income for the taxpayer, yet the de-
duction was allowed.
Hendrix and Cremona signal a serious erosion of the Frank
case. If the rationale of these cases were to be applied to the
Frank fact situation, at least some of the newspaper search ex-
penses would be allowed, namely those incurred after Frank had
taken an employment position with a newspaper. In fact, the
Frank taxpayer's argument for a Section 162 deduction seems
stronger than the unemployed salesman's argument in Hendrix.
A taxpayer who is already in a gainful position and incurs ex-
penses looking for another one should have a better claim for a
deduction than a taxpayer out of work looking for a position
similar to one held in the past.58
3. Existing Boundaries of the New Trade or Business Test for
the Section 162 Deduction of Investigatory Costs
It would appear that the rule to be synthesized from Haft,
Primuth, Cremona and Hendrix is that an investigatory expense
is deductible if the taxpayer's conduct and the surrounding cir-
cumstances indicate that he is actually motivated to procure a
future position somewhat related to a currently occupied or re-
cently abandoned position. It also would appear, at least from
Cremona and Hendrix, that the expenditure need not result in
a future position or indefinite income so long as the taxpayer
is found actually to be motivated to that end. This rule has
been applied only to employment agency fees in Cremona and
travel expenses in Hendrix. But there would appear to be no
reason to restrict the deduction to these two types of investiga-
tory expenses since the rationale of a broadened trade or busi-
ness status is just as appropriate for the deduction of the cost of
economic surveys and reports, job advertisements and other in-
cidentals to a search for employment.5 9 In addition, the con-
cept of such a trade or business status should be considered to in-
58. This is essentially the argument used in Primuth to justify a
deduction of the employment agency fee for a taxpayer who was ac-
tually in a gainful position at the time the expenditure was incurred.
59. See text accompanying notes 51-52 supra. Given the concept
that a taxpayer has a general field of endeavor which represents his
trade or business, it seems that any expenditure which helps him move
from interest to interest or position to position within that field, not
just an agency fee, would be incident to that "trade or business" and
not an investigation of a new one.
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clude taxpayers other than employees i.e., those who own their
own business. Hypothetically, it should apply, for example, to
allow the deduction for a sales franchisee who loses his fran-
chise and searches for another.60
However, there are apparently still limitations to the deduc-
tion of investigatory expenses under the newly developed trade
or business test. There is a residual requirement that the tax-
payer have a current or recent job or position which is fairly
similar to the job or position investigated. This clearly ex-
cludes taxpayers without previous employment experience such
as college graduates or servicemen, and those taxpayers who
have existing employment but are investigating a completely
unrelated field. The existence of this limitation is evidenced
by the reaffirmance in both Primuth and Cremona"' of the prin-
ciples of Eugene Carter.6 2 In Carter, the taxpayer could not de-
60. See note 59 supra. More generally, if the broadened trade or
business concept represented by Primuth, Haft and Hendrix is to have
impact over a wide field, McDonald v. Commissioner, 323 U.S. 57 (1944),
must be more closely limited to its facts. In McDonald the Supreme
Court held that campaign expenses of a judge who successfully sought
re-election, because of their preliminary nature, could not be deducted
under either Section 212 or Section 162. Criticism already has been
leveled at the McDonald majority's reading of Section 212 in two district
court cases dealing with campaign-related expenditures. See Maness v.
United States, 15 A.F.T.R.2d 217 (M.D. Fla. 1965); Davenport v. Camp-
bell, 14 A.F.T.R.2d 6004 (N.D. Tex. 1964); Comment, Taxation, Deduc-
tion of Campaign Expenses, 43 N. CAR. L. REv. 1004 (1965). Also, the
McDonald Court relies to some extent on an argument based on both
public policy and Congressional intent that expenditures made in poli-
tics in a democracy should not be subject to income tax deduction.
323 U.S. at 63. Since this policy is peculiar to politics, it is easy to
argue that McDonald should have little precedent value outside that
area.
In James B. Carey, 56 T.C. 477 (1971), the Tax Court had a chance
to reassess and limit McDonald in light of Primuth. There the court
was faced with campaign expenditures made in an unsuccessful attempt
by a union official to be reelected. The Court acknowledged that the
public policy features of the McDonald situation made that decision less
broadly applicable than had been thought in the past and that the
Court in McDonald had left open the possibility of the opposite result
in different fact situations. Id. at 480. The Tax Court, however, found
that the same public policy considerations applied as existed in McDon-
ald, as reflected in Congressional legislation dealing with unions. The
petitioner was thus denied the deduction. However, in denying the
deduction as it did, the court left the investigatory area open for the
application of Primuth in areas other than those involving elected offi-
cials. See also Comment, Tax Court Takes a Step Back in Disallowing
Union Official's Campaign Expense, 35 J. oF TAxATION 152 (1971).
61. David Primuth, 54 T.C. 374 (1970); Leonard Cremona, 58 T.C.
No. 20 (May 4, 1972).
62. 51 T.C. 932 (1969).
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duct search expenditures including an employment agency fee
incurred while in the armed forces.63 The court found his
trade or business to be that of an Air Force officer at the time
of the expenditures and that the expenditures in no way per-
tained to that business but to the sought-after new employment.
This approach seems undesirable and ignores the argument that
a taxpayer who has been well prepared or highly trained for a
given trade or business will have attained conceptually the same
trade or business status as a temporarily out-of-work person in
the same line of activity. Also, since the position investigated
must be similar to the one recently held, under the Carter prin-
ciple, a plumber could not deduct the expenses of investigating
a job as a bus driver even though he might have all the job
capabilities and be just as motivated to procure the new job as
a person presently in the trade or business of driving buses.
4. Possible Rationales for Expanding the Boundaries of the
New Trade or Business Test to Include All Investigating
Taxpayers
It is possible that the courts will build on the new trade
or business status concept to allow the investigatory expense
deductions for two groups of taxpayers presently excluded-
those who have an income-earning position but are exploring
an unrelated field, and those who have no previous income-
earning background at all. With respect to the first group, it
would be a relatively short step from the Primuth-Cremona
principle of trade or business status in a particular field, like
"executive" or "administrator," to the principle of trade or busi-
ness status as an "employee." Then the employed plumber in-
vestigating a bus driving job would be able to deduct investiga-
tory expenses on the basis that they are ordinary and necessary
expenses in moving from job to job in the trade or business of
"employee." Although the Cremona majority expressly found
that the taxpayer was in the trade or business of "administrator,"
three concurring judges agreed that the deductible counseling
fees "related to the taxpayer's current business of being an em-
ployee."64 Thus a broadened test such as this seems a possible
avenue for future development of the trade or business concept.
63. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5 (1958) which disallows the de-
duction for educational expenses which a taxpayer incurs to qualify him
for an entirely new business. See note 31 supra.
64. 58 T.C. No. 20 (May 4, 1972) (concurring opinion) (emphasis
added). However, language in one of the other concurring opinions,
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However, such an approach may not benefit the employed
taxpayer who incurs expenses investigating an unrelated in-
come-earning position in which he will be self-employed. To
allow the deduction in such a case would amount to a holding
that the taxpayer had the trade or business status of "income-
earner." This would appear to be a rather strained and artifi-
cial broadening of the trade or business concept, but is perhaps
not unacceptable in view of the artificiality which has prevailed
in this area.
The obstacle precluding a deduction in such cases could
also be overcome by a somewhat different approach which would
additionally allow the deduction to taxpayers in the second
group-i.e., those having no previous work experience but who
succeed in acquiring an income-earning position. Such a test
would involve pre-job or pre-position extension, a principle
which has been accepted in at least one recent Tax Court opin-
ion. In Cecil R. Hundley, Jr.,6 5 the court accepted the argument
that a taxpayer who is highly skilled and prepared is already
in a trade or business. 6  The taxpayer, a baseball player, was
allowed to deduct a contingent fee paid to his father for the
services of coaching and training him, and for advice in getting
the best possible professional baseball contract. The fee clearly
was paid for services rendered prior to the taxpayer's first job
as a baseball player. The court nevertheless found that the
taxpayer was in the trade or business of professional baseball
that "expenses related to changing one's basic skills ... cannot be
deemed to be incurred in an employee's trade or business" would seem
to deny such an approach. Id.
65. 48 T.C. 339 (1967).
66. It should be noted that the Service has long allowed all tax-
payers, whether having previous trade or business experience or not,
the deduction of certain employment agency fees which are charged to
the taxpayer contingent on procuring a position and which actually
result in his obtaining the position. See Tucker, supra note 53, at 353.
This broad allowance of an expense incurred preliminary to attain-
ment of a business interest or employment is inconsistent with
the Service's stance on investigatory expenses generally and with
Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1 (1957) which denies a deduction for the ex-
penses of employment seeking. In 1960 an ill-fated attempt to re-
verse the policy and disallow the agency fee ended in reinstatement
of the deduction. See generally Fleischer, IRS About-Face in Employ-
ment Fees Shows Shaky Basis for Taxing Similar Items, 13 J. OF TAXA-
TiON 82 (1960).
The policy of allowing the agency fee deduction if the expenditure
results in employment was reaffirmed in the recent Rev. Rul. 71-308,
1971-2 CuM. BULL. 82. Apparently, in view of Primuth, the require-
ment that the fees be charged contingent on the taxpayer acquiring the
position has been dropped. See note 55 and accompanying text supra.
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playing before the contract was signed and allowed the expense
deduction and held that Frank and other restrictive investiga-
tory expense cases were not in point. 67
By using Hundley as precedent in developing the trade or
business status concept beyond its present state, it is possible
that a Section 162 deduction could be allowed for taxpayers
with no background relevant to the new job or position ob-
tained. The taxpayer who was successful in his investigation
would be considered to be engaged in a trade or business from
the time he evidenced his original commitment by incurring
search expenses. 6 This might be referred to as pre-activity ex-
tension. Though slightly more difficult, a similar argument
could be made to support a deduction for the investigating tax-
payer whose search is unsuccessful. That is, it can be argued
that a commitment to finding a job or position in the particular
field investigated, as manifested by the tax-payer's incurrence
of a conceded investigatory expense, is sufficient to give such
a taxpayer trade or business status at that time even though
the search subsequently proved fruitless. However, such an
argument appears somewhat artificial and rather oddly would
allow a taxpayer to have trade or business status, although only
for the purpose of an investigatory expense deduction, even
though he has never in the past and possibly never will in the
future engage in income-earning activity in the relevant field.
Despite the conceptual problems in continuing the develop-
ment of the new trade or business test, it is possible that the
courts will undertake such development since conceptual artifi-
cialities already have permeated recent decisions, and some sort
of resolution appears necessary. The alternatives are either to
tolerate inconsistency of treatment among equally profit-minded
taxpayers or to find a provision more amenable to a deduction
of investigatory expenses for all such taxpayers.
67. For a similar case under the Section 212 "existing interest"
requirement, see Caruso v. United States, 236 F. Supp. 88 (D.N.J. 1964),
where the taxpayer who paid a legal expense to have his name reinstated
at the top of a civil service job eligibility list was allowed to deduct the
expense since the status to be protected was an "existing interest."
However, the court also extended trade or business standing to allow
the deduction under Section 162 on the ground that the taxpayer had a
pre-job employment interest. See text accompanying notes 85 & 86 in-
fra.
68. But see the background discussion of the fundamental require-
ments of a "trade or business" in note 25 supra.
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C. NONBUSINESS EXPENSE TREATMENT UNDER SECTION 212
At first glance the broad language of Section 212(1) ap-
pears more promising than Section 162 to justify deduction of
an individual's investigatory expenses. Section 212(1) states
that all ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred for
the production or collection of income are deductible. 9 How-
ever, an examination of the case law and legislative history
of the provision would reveal that the weight of authority
finds Section 162 and Section 212 to be equally restrictive.
It is widely recognized 70 that the purpose of the provision
that is now Section 212 was to avoid the type of result that was
reached in Higgins v. Commissioner.7 In Higgins the Supreme
Court held that a wealthy investor living in Paris could not de-
duct the expenses of maintaining and staffing an office in New
York to manage, under his direction, his investments in stocks
and bonds. The Court found that the "trade or business" lan-
guage of the predecessor to Section 162 was not broad enough
to include the taxpayer's activities. By its subsequent passage
of Section 212, Congress intended to overrule Higgins and allow
a deduction of the ordinary and necessary expenses of income
interests other than those which would qualify as a trade or
business. 72 For example, the provision most likely would allow
a full time lawyer a deduction of the expenses for upkeep of
houses or apartments which are rented out for extra income."
The committee report for what is now Section 212 states that
all the restrictions and limitations that apply to a deduction
under Section 162 also apply under Section 212 except for the
requirement that the expense be incurred in a trade or busi-
ness.7 4 The courts have interpreted this statement to mean that
69. IRC § 212(1) states that
[i]n the case of an individual, there shall be allowed as a de-
duction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or in-
curred during the taxable year-
(1) for the production or collection of income ....
70. B. BITTKER, FEDERAL INCOME ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 204-05
(3d ed. 1964).
71. 312 U.S. 212 (1941).
72. See B. BI=rIER, supra note 70, at 204-05.
73. See Kilbourn, Deductible Expenses: Transactions Entered Into
for Profit; Income Producing Property, 21 N.Y.U. TAX INST. 193, 203-04
(1963).
74. H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 75 (1942). See Treas.
Reg. 1.212-1 (1957) which specifically disallows the expense of seeking
new employment, or of campaigning for office. See also Nahstoll, Non-
Trade and Non-Business Expense Deductions: Section 23 (A) (2) of the
Internal Revenue Code, 46 MIcH. L. REv. 1015 (1948).
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only expenses incurred in connection with some existing inter-
est of the taxpayer are deductible under Section 212.75 This
requirement of an existing interest has made Section 212 coex-
tensive with Section 162 in the sense that any expense prelim-
inary to the acquisition of such nonbusiness interest will be non-
deductible. Since the expenditures made in attempting to be-
come a trustee are preliminary to acquisition of the interest, for
example, they are nondeductible under Section 212. ' Thus it
has generally been held that investigatory expenses, which are
also preliminary in nature, are not deductible under the pro-
vision.'
7 7
The legislative history also contains support for the contrary
proposition. The committee report states that a deduction is
allowable under the provision, whether or not connected with
the taxpayer's trade or business, "if it is expended in the pur-
suit of income or in connection with property held for the pro-
duction of income .... ."78 Thus it has been argued 0 that
Congress had a larger purpose in enacting Section 212, namely,
to allow even search expenditures to be deducted, provided they
genuinely are made in the pursuit of potential future income.
This argument is bolstered by the fact that Section 212(2) al-
lows a deduction for the "management, conservation, or mainte-
nance of property held for the production of income" (emphasis
added). It can be argued that such language indicates Con-
gressional intent that there be an exisiting property interest
prerequisite to a Section 212(2) deduction; therefore the absence
of comparable language in Section 212(1), which allows deduc-
tions "for the production or collection of income," means that
no comparable existing interest is required.
Nevertheless, with respect to investigatory expenses, the
case law leans toward a restrictive reading. In McDonald v.
Commissioner80 a majority of the Supreme Court held that cam-
75. See, e.g., Ellsworth Statler, 25 T.C. 1175 (1956); Henry Brawner,
36 B.T.A. 884 (1937). See also Fleischer, The Tax Treatment of Ex-
penses Incurred in Investigation for a Business or Capital Investment,
14 TAx L. REV. 567, 580-84 (1959).
-76. Ellsworth Statler, 25 T.C. 1175 (1956). See also Treas. Reg.
§ 1.212-1(k) (1957).
77. Eugene Walet, 31 T.C. 461 (1958) (dictum); J.D. O'Connor, 13
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 623 (1954); Raymond Collier, 13 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 857 (1954); Leon Chooluck, 13 CCH Tax CL Mem. 864 (1954);
Morton Frank, 20 T.C. 511 (1953).
78. H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong. 2d Sess. 46 (1942).
79. Fleischer, supra note 75, at 581-84; Nahstoll, supra note 74.
80. 323 U.S. 57 (1944). See also Bowers v. Lumpkin, 140 F.2d
927 (4th Cir. 1944).
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paign expenditures made by a judge seeking to gain reelection
were nondeductible under Section 212(1) on the ground that
that provision did not enlarge the range of allowable deductions
of business expenses, but "merely enlarged the category of in-
comes with reference to which expenses were deductible."81 The
McDonald Court made a finding that the taxpayer was entering
what constituted a trade or business under Section 162. Subse-
quent cases therefore have relied on McDonald in denying the
Section 212 deduction of investigatory expenses preliminary to
a trade or business on the ground that to allow the deduction
would be to enlarge the range of deductions to which Section
162 is applicable.8 2 The courts also have generally interpreted
the McDonald restriction as prohibiting the deduction of invest-
igatory expenses under Section 212 where the interest investi-
gated would not be a "trade or business. '8 3 To a certain extent
this second application of McDonald ignores an argument. To
grant the Section 212 deduction would not enlarge the range of
previously allowable deductions under that provision since the
Section 212 type of interest was not covered at all under prior
law. Courts arguably should be free to set wide boundaries on
the range of deductions relating to this new "category of in-
come."8 4  The denial of the investigatory expense deduction
probably would occur without the McDonald precedent, how-
ever, given the existing interest requirement which the courts
have read into Section 212 (1).
In the more recent case of Caruso v. United States,8" it was
held that a taxpayer whose name had been unfairly removed
from the top of a civil service list could deduct under either Sec-
tion 162 or Section 212 the legal expenses incurred to reinstate
his name on the list. In recognizing that section 212 could ap-
ply to what the court characterized as the taxpayer's existing
employment interest in remaining on the list, the court seems to
imply that a status preliminary to entrance into a Section 162
81. 323 U.S. at 62 (emphasis added). For the "liberal" view as-
serted by Mr. Justice Black in dissent, see id. at 62.
82. See, e.g., Eugene Walet, 31 T.C. 461 (1958); Morton Frank,
20 T.C. 511 (1953).
83. See, e.g., Marion Burt Beck, 15 T.C. 642 (1950).
84. It has been argued in Fleischer, supra note 75, at 583 n. 77, that
McDonald is of no precedent value with regard to the deduction of
investigatory expenses where the interest investigated is not a trade or
business since there was a specific finding in McDonald that the tax-
payer was entering a trade or business in seeking to become a judge.
85. 236 F. Supp. 88 (D.N.J. 1964).
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trade or business may by itself constitute a Section 212 interest.
However, in Caruso the court did not use Section 212 inde-
pendently to enlarge the range of allowable deductions since
the court already had been willing to allow the deduction ini-
tially under Section 162. The future precedent value of Caruso
for a Section 212 deduction of investigations preliminary to a
Section 162 trade or business would appear to be quite limited
for this reason. Though not inconceivable, it seems unlikely that
a court would apply Section 212 to permit deduction of expenses
preliminary to a Section 162 trade or business if the court was
unwilling to find that the deduction should also be allowed
under Section 162. A court which would be willing to apply
Section 212 in such a situation probably would be even more
likely to extend Section 162 to give the taxpayer pre-job trade
or business status.
The Caruso court itself engaged in some Section 162 pre-job
extension, in finding that the taxpayer had trade or business
status as well as existing interest status in being on the top
of the list. It accordingly allowed the deduction of legal fees in-
curred to restore the taxpayer's prime job eligibility as top
name on the civil service list. This recalls the approach in
Hundley where the taxpayer was held to be in the "business"
of professional baseball player prior to signing his first con-
tract.8 6 The Caruso court, however, expressly denied that such
pre-job extension could be applied to allow the deduction of in-
vestigatory expenses.87 Thus, although courts reasoning in the
Caruso manner may be willing to make some pre-activity ex-
tensions, they will go no further under Section 212 than they
will under Section 162 in similar situations.8 8
III. LOSS DEDUCTION UNDER SECTION 165
At one time, only losses incurred in a trade or business were
deductible. However, in 1916 Congress amended the Code to al-
86. See text accompanying notes 65-67 supra.
87. 236 F. Supp. at 95.
88. In Primuth where the taxpayer was successful in arguing for a
Section 162 deduction of an employment agency fee, the Tax Court did
not squarely confront the McDonald application of Section 212 in a
Section 162-type situation, as had the Caruso court. The court in Pri-
muth rejected the application of Section 212 expressly in deference to
McDonald. 54 T.C. at 381 (1970). The court also was concerned about
the unequal treatment of Sections 212 and 162 deductions under the net




low individuals to deduct losses in "transactions entered into for
profit. '89 Soon after this amendment, the Internal Revenue
Service ruled that a "transaction entered into for profit" in-
cluded an investigation of the possibility of entering a new busi-
ness.90 In I.T. 1505,91 the Service ruled that the expenses of
sending an agent abroad to investigate the possibility of organ-
izing an export business were deductible by the taxpayer as a
loss even though unrelated to the taxpayer's current activities
as a salaried employee and even though the idea was abandoned
before any activity which would constitute a business operation
was undertaken.
The transaction for profit test as applied to allow the loss
deduction of investigatory expenses was subsequently refined
in the Robert Lyons Hague and Charles T. Parker cases. In
Hague92 the Tax Court found that attorney's fees, paid for ad-
vice not to enter into a land purchase deal or patent project,
were not deductible as a loss. The court found that there was
no "transaction entered into for profit," since petitioner did not
enter the transactions but, on the contrary, stayed out of them.
In Parker,93 however, the court distinguished Hague and al-
lowed the loss deduction. The court held that the taxpayer
had entered and then subsequently abandoned a transaction
when, in exploring the purchase of mining property, he made a
30 day test operation on the mine and rejected the investment
because of low yield. The court admitted that the taxpayer
had not entered permanent profit-making operations, but felt
he had undertaken more than a "mere preliminary investiga-
tion."94
The uncertain state of the law resulting from these cases
89. The proponents of the amendment in Congress emphasized the
unfairness of allowing losses in an established business such as stock
trading, while not allowing an individual engaged in infrequent stock
speculation to deduct losses in identical transactions. J. SEaDMAN, SEID-
MAN'S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAwS: 1938-1861
964-65 (1938).
The current provision, IRC § 165 (c), provides that
[i]n the case of an individual, the deduction. . . shall be limited
to-
(1) losses incurred in a trade or business;(2) losses incurred in any transaction entered into for
profit, though not connected with a trade or business
90. I.T. 1505, 1-2 CUM. BuLL. 112 (1922).
91. Id.
92. Robert Hague, 24 B.T.A. 288 (1931).
93. Charles Parker, 1 T.C. 709 (1943).
94. Id. at 711.
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was finally resolved in 1957 when the IRS reversed its earlier
position and ruled that investigatory expenses were not deduct-
ible under the Section 165(c) (2) transaction for profit test."
Citing the strong precedent of the then recent Frank opinion
and the Hague case, the IRS propounded the broad policy that
no expenses would be deductible as losses unless they were
"more than investigatory."9  In so doing, Hague and Frank
were approved and I.T. 1505 was revoked. Parker was dis-
tinguished by stressing that the test operations in Parker were
more than investigatory since the taxpayer's activity was in it-
self a temporary investment. It is critical to the distinction
that the taxpayer in Parker formed a joint venture, retained
employees and actually kept the output from the mine. Thus,
the endeavor was both an investigation of a further transaction
or business and also a transaction of itself, as if the taxpayer
simply had leased a mining operation for a month. The fact
that this one month operation was carried on for profit, as well
as to determine the feasibility of purchase, made it a transaction
for profit. The fact that preliminary investigations will rarely
overlap with short-term profit-taking makes Revenue Ruling 57-
418 which allowed the deduction in Parker particularly restric-
tive.
This narrow treatment of preliminary expenses under Sec-
tion 165 (c) (2) has prevailed until recently in all but a few
cases.9 7 Most courts have relied on Frank or the revenue ruling,
and without detailed analysis have disallowed the claimed de-
duction of investigatory expenses. 8  Frank itself, in denying
the deduction under Sections 162, 212, and 165 (c) (2) under the
same circumstances seems to indicate a covert judicial attitude
that the three provisions are coextensive as applied to investi-
gatory expenditures.
In Harris Seed9 9 the strict interpretation of the loss deduc-
95. Rev. RuL 57-418, 1957-2 Cum. BuLL. 143.
96. Id. at 144.
97. The deviants from the narrow treatment approach have gen-
erally been federal district courts. See, e.g., Finch v. United States,
18 A.F.T.R.2d 5259 (D. Minn. 1966) (architect fees, attorney fees and
travel expenses allowed since loss site could not be acquired prior to
proposed grant of motel franchise-the "agreement" to get the franchise
was the transaction); Colman v. United States, 9 A.F.T.R.2d 639 (D.C.
Utah 1961) (travel expenses to investigate possibility of acquiring oil
lease, subsequently abandoned-taxpayer had infrequent prior experi-
ence in such ventures).
98. See, e.g., Paul Seguin, 26 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 950 (1967).
99. 52 T.C. 880 (1969).
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tion was appreciably relaxed by the Tax Court. In that case
the taxpayer incurred expenses in attempting to incorporate a
savings and loan association. 10 0 The project was abandoned
when the incorporation proposal was rejected and before the
commencement of any business activity. The court held that
the taxpayer's activities, though merely preparatory to final op-
eration of the business, constituted a "transaction" in the sense
of actual operation for profit as defined in Parker. In reaching
the result, the court reasoned that if Section 165 (c) (2) was to
add anything to the Section 165(c) (1) trade or business test, it
must contemplate activities which constitute something less than
the carrying on of a trade or business. The court distinguished
Frank in that Frank undertook no obligations in visiting various
newspaper locales whereas the Seed taxpayer clearly had com-
mitted himself to purchase stock if the savings and loan charter
were granted. 10 In so holding, the court diminished the im-
portance of the "transaction" aspect of Section 165(c) (2) ,102
while placing considerable emphasis on the taxpayer's profit mo-
tive as evidenced by his binding commitment to the undertaking.
This seems to represent a liberalization of the Parker test since
the Seed taxpayer had not entered actual profit-making activity.
The court did assert, however, that a transaction for profit must
be more than "the mere casual preliminary investigation of a
prospective business or investment."' 0 3
The Harris Seed decision can be criticized in at least two
respects. First, the court attempted to distinguish Frank by
stating that Frank had incurred no firm commitments. Yet at
least some of his efforts would qualify as such. In several of
the cities he visited he incurred expenses in making unsuccessful
bids on properties which he fully intended to purchase had the
100. Specifically, the taxpayer incurred expenses for an economic
survey as well as legal and accounting expenses in preparing applica-
tions for a charter. While the applications were pending he ex-
pended additional sums for incorporation plans and a successful stock
subscription. Id.
101. 52 T.C. at 887.
102. Most commentators agree that there are two tests in the "trans-
action for profit" wording. See Fleischer, supra note 75, at 585; Com-
ment, The Transaction Test for Federal Income Tax Loss Deductions,
27 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 158, 159 (1970). See also Theodore B. Jefferson,
50 T.C. 963, 968 (1968); 5A J. MERTENS, supra note 4, at § 28.34.
103. 52 T.C. at 885 (emphasis added). The court also cited from Eli
Goodman, 30 T.C. 1178, 1192 (1958), aff'd, 267 F.2d 127 (1st Cir. 1959),
where the bona fide transaction for profit was described as a transaction




bids been accepted. Second, the court relied on the argument
that the transaction for profit test would be meaningless if in-
terpreted to include only trade or business transactions. It is
well accepted that there are certain transactions which an in-
dividual taxpayer may enter and yet not be considered in a
trade or business. For instance, a taxpayer may make a small
stock investment for the first time and not be considered in the
business of stock trading. His loss on the sale of the stock
would not be deductible but for Section 165 (c) (2).104 Indeed,
the primary intent of Congress in passing the transaction for
profit provision was to allow the deduction of the loss on such
nonbusiness speculation. 105 Thus, while the court is undoubt-
edly correct in its assertion that Section 165(c) (2) would be
meaningless if the test of transaction for profit granted no de-
ductions in addition to those given by the trade or business loss
provision, this alone in no way requires a finding that Section
165(c) (2) was intended to apply to mere preparations for oper-
ating a business.
The effect of Seed on investigatory expense deductions might
be influenced by two additional aspects of the case. First,
there was no real "search" in Seed. The expenses were more in
the nature of initial preparation for a particular planned enter-
prise. If this is what is meant in the opinion by "commitment,"
investigatory expenses are simply not such a commitment But
second, the court distinguished Frank by stating that no aban-
donment had taken place. Although this is an accurate state-
ment, it is clear that the denial of a loss deduction in Frank
was based fundamentally on the taxpayer's failure to enter a
narrowly-defined "transaction." In distinguishing Frank on the
abandonment basis, the Seed opinion may have opened the way
for an alternative reading of Frank that would facilitate a more
liberal transaction test. Such a reading would minimize the
finding in Frank that the taxpayer entered no transaction when
104. J. SEimDAN, SEm.AN's LEsisLATIV HISTORY OF FEDRAL INCOM
TAxLAWS: 1938-1861,964-65 (1938).
105. Id. There is no explicit support in the legislative history of
Section 165 (c) (2) for the proposition that Congress intended a second-
ary purpose of allowing the deduction for expenses incurred prior to
actual business operation. The only indications of a larger purpose are
the statements that 'transaction" is a "very broad word" and that by
itself "it means anything." 53 CONG. REc. 13265 (1916). Thus the
court may have been forced to make the rather tenuous statutory lan-
guage argument of reading Section 165 (c) (1) and (c) (2) together to
avoid resorting to the legislative history which is largely unfavorable
to the court's position.
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each newspaper site was explored and would emphasize the as-
sertion in the opinion that
[i]f the general search for a suitable business property itself
be considered as a transaction entered into for profit, no aban-
donment of such project occurred in the taxable year so as
to enable deduction of these expenses as losses.100
Such a reading would appear to allow the deduction of all the
expenses of an abandoned unsuccessful search.
The Seed opinion does not elaborate on the broad guideline
that the taxpayer's investigations must be more than casual and
there has been no subsequent attempt to refine this potential
profit motive test. For example, in the recent memorandum
decision of Theodore R. Price,10 7 the court granted a loss de-
duction to a taxpayer who had incurred expenses in attempting
to organize a national bank. 0 8 The court found that the taxpayer
had had some past experience as an employee in organizing bank-
ing institutions. But in the court's view, this sporadic activity did
not qualify the taxpayer for trade or business status as an in-
dependent promoter and thus he could not deduct the outlays
as a Section 162 expense. Similarly, he could not deduct the ex-
penses under Section 212 since there was no existing interest.
In finding that the taxpayer was entitled to a loss deduction,
however, the court insisted that, as in Parker, the taxpayer had
"engaged in activities directly relevant and material" to the
formation of a "new business."' 0 9  The court held that such
activities constituted "actual operations" within the meaning of
Parker and strained to distinguish Frank on the basis that the
taxpayer in that case incurred expenses in exploring the possible
acquisition of an "existing" business. The court felt that since
the expenses could have been capitalized if the project had been
successful, there was no reason not to allow the deduction of
these expenditures as a loss when the project was abandoned.
As in Seed, the court took an expanded view of the actual
operation concept, but did not take the opportunity to refine the
profit motive test latent in the Seed opinion. Furthermore, the
court's distinction of Frank and Parker, based on the dichot-
omy between new enterprises and existing businesses, is not
accurate as a factual matter. The taxpayer in Parker was in-
106. 20 T.C. 511, 514-15 (1953).
107. 30 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1405-3 (1971).
108. The expenditures were for surveying, mapping and photo-
graphing the proposed location and for completing forms for the
charter application.
109. 30 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. at 1410 (emphasis added).
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vestigating a mining operation which was "existing" in the sense
that the apparatus for mining was already assembled, and actual
operations merely had been suspended by the owner before the
test run was made. Even if the distinction were factually cor-
rect, it is difficult to see a rationale for such a distinction. The
distinction has no relevance to the issue of whether the tax-
payer can be considered to have begun actual operational activ-
ity or whether he has profit motive. Rather, it seems a some-
what arbitrary basis on which to grant or deny a deduction since,
from the point of view of investigating taxpayers, a "new" busi-
ness is always being entered. The tenuous distinction of Frank
would appear to be a weak attempt to avoid direct confrontation
with, and erosion of that opinion.
The Internal Revenue Service recently has accepted a lib-
eral interpretation of a "transaction," at least in one instance.
It has ruled that expenses preliminary to the possible acquisition
of an oil lease are deductible as a loss if the project is unsuc-
cessful.110 The language of the ruling announcing this policy is
somewhat ambiguous as to whether the loss is allowed under
Section 165 (c) (1) (trade or business losses) or under Section
165(c) (2) (transaction for profit losses). The latter char-
acterization was probably relied on primarily since the ruling
explicitly states that the taxpayer entered a transaction for
profit in his attempts to acquire the lease."" A prior revenue
ruling was cited which had ruled that identical expenses were
to be capitalized where the taxpayer subsequently acquired the
lease.112 The Service reasoned that since no leases were ac-
quired, there could be no capitalization with respect to these ex-
penses and therefore there must be a deductible loss.
Although the Service has confined this liberalization to the
oil and gas venture field, it is clear that it is a significant
breakthrough in the Service's attitude toward the transaction
110. Rev. RuL 71-191, 1971 INT. REV. BULL. No. 16, at 14. The items
for which the taxpayer was allowed the deduction in the ruling were
fees paid for geological advice on lands available for leasing, the cost
of preparation of a filed offer to lease, and the federal filing fee.
111. Engagement in a series of transactions may not constitute the
type of activity which qualifies under the trade or business test for the
purposes of Section 162. It is unlikely that the trade or business lan-
guage in Section 165(c) (1) would be interpreted much differently.
See note 25 supra.
112. Rev. Rul 67-141, 1967-1 Cmv BULL 153. The costs are then
"recovered" through depletion. The 1967 ruling did not effect a sig-
nificant change, but followed prior law. See Dorothy Cockburn, 16 T.C.
775 (1951); L.S. Munger, 14 T.C. 1236 (1950).
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test. It is the first time that the Service has acknowledged that
less than actual operation or investment will qualify as a "trans-
action" and the new test could easily be applied to other in-
vestigations than those involving mineral exploration.' 
13
Also significant in the ruling is the relationship of the loss
deduction and capitalization with respect to investigatory ex-
penses. 114 Some of the expenses, e.g., a preparation cost of the
offer to lease the mineral lands, were not purely search ex-
penses because they were incurred after a definite decision had
been made to pursue a particular interest. But the fees paid by
the taxpayer for advice as to land available for mineral lease
are clearly search expenses. In the ruling the Service treats
all these expenses alike by allowing the loss deduction and by
asserting that they would be capitalized if there had been a suc-
cessful acquisition. Thus it apparently recognizes that investi-
gatory expenditures may be capitalized just like any other pre-
liminary expenditure and that the determination as to whether
they are capitalized or deducted immediately as a loss depends
on whether the sought-after interest ultimately is acquired.' 1
This view avoids a more comprehensive analysis of the issue
of whether search expenditures should be capitalized at all. It
might be argued first that capitalization is not the appropriate
treatment for investigatory expenses because there is not really
a "permanent improvement or betterment" as defined in Section
263.116 Although the courts have not adhered strictly to this
characterization of the nature of the capital outlay and have
allowed capitalization recoupment where the expense abstractly
"benefits" the taxpayer over the lifetime of the asset or inter-
est," 7 it might still be argued that investigatory expenses fall
113. The actual impact of the ruling itself on oil and gas ventures is
not as great as it may seem since some courts have been quite free in
the past in granting loss deductions for the preliminary expenses of
mining ventures, despite the lack of a well defined trade or business in
some of the cases. See Colman v. United States, 9 A.F.T.R.2d 639 (D.
Utah 1961); Leslie Duryea, 6 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 926 (1947); Charles
Parker, 1 T.C. 709 (1943); Fleischer, supra note 75, at 574-75.
114. See discussion in text accompanying notes 107-09 supra, of
Theodore Price, 30 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1405-3 (1971), where the
court's allowance of the loss deduction rested in part on the idea that
the expenses apparently would have been capitalized had the venture
been successful.
115. 1971 INT. REv. BULL. No. 16, at 15.
116. IRC, § 263.
117. See generally Richmond Television Corp. v. United States,
345 F.2d 901 (4th Cir. 1965); United States v. Akin, 248 F.2d 742
(10th Cir. 1957); S.M. Howard, 39 T.C. 833 (1963); Treas. Reg. § 1.263
(a) -1, -2 (1958); 4A J. MERTENS, supra note 4, at § 25.20.
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outside of this broader characterization. This result accrues be-
cause investigatory expenses are not as clearly linked to the
future of the asset or interest as are, for instance, legal fees for
the acquisition of land and expenditures for good will, both of
which may be capitalized.."8
Another objection to capitalization might be the personal
aspect of the expenditures. Since Section 262 asserts that no
deduction can be allowed for personal expenses,11 9 it can be
argued that capital recoupment as well as expense deductions
should be denied to personally tainted expenditures. However,
the recent case of Gilmore v. United States2 0 seems to refute
such an argument. There it was held that the cost of defending
title to controlling stock in a corporation could be added to the
basis of the stock despite the fact that the expenditure arose
from a personal context because title had been challenged in a
divorce action, and despite the fact that in a prior action2 1 a
Section 212 deduction had been denied for that very reason.
The opinion suggests that even though a personal taint bars an
ordinary deduction, capitalization is not necessarily prevented.
More generally, it might be troublesome conceptually to al-
low capitalization of investigatory expenses relating to employ-
ment since no asset is acquired when one becomes an em-
ployee.12 2 The practical aspect of this problem is that when a
taxpayer quits or leaves his job, it is difficult to find a "sale or
exchange of a capital asset" under Section 1211 because "capital
asset" is defined in Section 1221 as certain property held by
the taxpayer. Likewise a "sale or other disposition of property"
under Section 1001 to trigger either a capital or ordinary loss is
equally difficult to find. But the Tax Court in Primuth indi-
cated a receptiveness to some sort of loss at termination of em-
ployment by expressly stating that had the employment fee
expense in that situation been capitalized, "presumably ... the
118. It should be noted in connection with the issue of whether
an outlay is a capital expenditure or an expense that it may be neither.
See Connally Realty Co., 31 B.T.A. 349, affd 81 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1936)(alteration expenditure on a building when adjacent street raised);
Rev. Rul. 65-241, 1965-2 Cum. BULL. 44 (costs to cooperative of pur-
chasing stock in a bank for cooperatives in order to get a loan from it);
Note, Income Tax Accounting: Business Expense or Capital Outlay, 47
HAnv. L. REv. 669 (1934).
119. IRC, § 262.
120. 245 F. Supp. 383 (N.D. Cal. 1965).
121. United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39 (1963).
122. This difficulty was stressed in David Primuth, 54 T.C. 374, 380(1970).
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fee would be deductible when the related employment is term-
inated.' 2
3
Despite these objections there appears to be ample authority
for the proposition that investigatory expenditures should be
permitted to be capitalized in most cases. The oil loss revenue
ruling 2 4 cited above has found recent support in the Price
case. 125 Earlier, in Dwight Ward,126 a case decided in the same
year as Frank, the court acknowledged without discussion that
expenditures for travel, research and tests in investigating the
market should be added to the cost basis of stock in the enter-
prise. In the Primuth opinion where the taxpayer was allowed
to deduct the employment fee which helped him procure a job
similar to the one he had held previously, the court suggested
that the expenditure could have been capitalized if the taxpayer
had been changing his field of endeavor.
127
IV. A WORKABLE SECTION 165 (c) (2) TEST FOR THE
DEDUCTION OF INVESTIGATORY COSTS FOR
SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL SEARCHES
A continued sympathy on the part of the courts for the
investigating taxpayer would reflect not only a decision that
123. David Primuth, 54 T.C. 374, 380 (1970). More generally, with
respect to both business and employment, it has been suggested that a
separate loss deduction be taken at the time of abandonment of a busi-
ness on the basis that at that time the Section 165(c) (2) transaction
is abandoned. See Mandell, Deductibility of Pre-Operating Expenses:
Successful and Unsuccessful Ventures, N.Y.U. 25TH INST. ON FED. TAX
1235, 1241 (1967).
124. See note 110 supra. For an earlier ruling which suggests a dif-
ferent result on investigatory expenses see Rev. Rul. 55-442, 1955-2
Cum. BULL. 529, which held that preliminary expenses in search of a
campsite were nondeductible. The Commissioner by implication ex-
cluded search expenses (expenditures for checking campsites other
than the one eventually acquired) from capital treatment by listing
separately the preliminary expenditures which could be capitalized
(bonuses paid for signing lease, appraisal costs and legal expenses prior
to acquiring the campsite).
125. See text accompanying notes 107-09 supra.
126. 20 T.C. 332 (1953).
127. David Primuth, 54 T.C. 374, 380 (1970). The court stated that
"[f]urther, we do not find the instant situation analogous to the capital
expense incurred by an individual in the course of changing his
field of endeavor." The court rejected capitalization in the situation
before it in part because of the difficulty of associating employment,
which is not an asset in the traditional sense, with capitalization.
For a general discussion of investigatory cost capitalization, see
Mandell, supra note 123, at 1238-39 (1967), where it is maintained that
investigatory costs are "generally" capitalized and amortized if possible
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investigatory expenses are not personal, but also that such ex-
penses should be allowed as a matter of policy and Congress-
sional intent. It is important, however, to give careful thought
to some additional problems of consistency. As a general rule,
it seems clear that consistency in denying the deduction to all
taxpayers or in granting it to all taxpayers is most desirable as
a more fundamental policy of tax law unless there is some com-
pelling reason for distinguishing between taxpayers. This policy
is generally desirable since tax law is an area where public opin-
ion is often most sensitive to inconsistencies and inequities.
There would appear to be no overwhelming reason to dis-
tinguish between investigating taxpayers as the courts have
done under Section 162. Under the Section 162 test the courts,
at least for the present, will deny the deduction to taxpayers
who have no previous income-earning positions similar to the
one investigated, and yet will allow the deduction to the tax-
payer with the required background. 128 Assuming that they
are equally profit-motivated, the only compelling reason for
denying the deduction to one and not the other might be the
problem of proof but this has yet to be articulated by any court.
The argument would be that such past experience strongly indi-
cates legitimate profit motive. However, it is likely that a tax-
payer's educational preparation and other experiences might in-
dicate such motive just as strongly. In addition, it should not
be too strenuous a task for the courts to inquire into other cir-
cumstances in a particular case probative of motive since such
inquiries are often pursued by the courts in other areas of tax
law.129
If the deduction of investigatory expenses is found desirable
for all profit-motivated taxpayers, it is still necessary to find
a Code provision which by its terms does not distinguish among
such taxpayers. It seems likely that Section 162 cannot be used
since the language requiring that all expenses must be incurred
because of their similarity to purchases of good will. See also 4A J.
MERT Ns, supra note 4, § 25.08 at 33 for the statement that it is "indis-
putable" that expenses incurred in deciding whether to establish a busi-
ness are capital, but Frank, among other cases, is cited as authority.
In Frank the tax court expressly refused to deal with the issue. See
note 12 and accompanying text supra.
128. See discussion of Eugene Carter, 51 T.C. 932 (1969), in text
accompanying note 62 supra.
129. See text accompanying note 136 infra. A discussion of a pro-




in a "trade or business" may prevent the deduction for tax-
payers whose trade or business is unrelated to the field investi-
gated, or who have never been in what could be considered a
trade or business. Section 212 is correspondingly narrow since
the existing interest requirement, at least with respect to in-
vestigatory expenses, has become the basis for the same limita-
tions as those developed under Section 162. However, a lib-
erally construed Section 165(c) (2) would cover all investigating
taxpayers if they have a substantial profit motive since the
"transaction for profit" language does not allow for any dis-
crimination between taxpayers. 3 0
In addition to providing consistency of treatment, the trans-
action for profit test also affords some flexibility unavailable
with the Section 162 test. Under the latter provision, once the
taxpayer has established trade or business status, his deduction
will be allowed without much further analysis of legitimate
profit motive. Under the transaction for profit test, however,
once the transaction aspect is minimized, the profit motive part
of the test controls. This not only relieves taxpayers who have
a legitimate profit motive with no previous work experience or
trade or business status, but it also would prevent a taxpayer
without legitimate motive from receiving the investigatory de-
duction even though he might otherwise achieve trade or busi-
ness status. To develop such a salutary test would obviously
require a rejection of the developed trade or business status con-
cept, at least as applied to investigatory expenses. Then each
taxpayer would be scrutinized similarly for a legitimate profit
motive.' 3 '
If capitalization is found to be suitable for investigatory ex-
penses, a loss would be allowed for an unsuccessful search and
capitalization would result if an interest in fact were acquired.
In the case of a protracted search there are two theories which
might be used, one of which would allow a loss deduction for
some expenses of a successful searcher. Under the "multiple
130. See 4A J. MERTENS, supra note 4, § 25.99, at 363 n. 21. Mertens
suggests that a loss deduction for the expenses of employment seeking
should be allowed in the year in which the possibility of securing new
employment is abandoned.
131. An expenditure is deductible generally under Section 165(c)
(2) if the taxpayer meets the other aspects of the test and has, as the
principal motive, the purpose of deriving profit. The expectation of
profit need not be reasonable as long as it is in good faith. See




transaction" theory each separate search in a different locale
-or into a different interest would be considered a transaction
within the meaning of Section 165(c) (2) and considered aban-
doned when the taxpayer quit exploring that particular locale
or interest. This theory obviously would still allow the deduc-
tion of all expenses for the unsuccessful searcher. The success-
ful searcher could take a loss deduction for all the expenses of
each of the transactions investigated prior to the one ultimately
entered. Since they would result in an acquisition, investiga-
tions into the chosen enterprise would be capitalized. Under the
other theory, the entire search would be considered one trans-
action so long as it related to a single field of endeavor or in-
vestment. Under this view, the taxpayer who is unsuccessful
could take a loss deduction when the search was abandoned and
the successful searcher could capitalize all the expenditures since
no abandonment of the transaction would have occurred when
the interest was acquired.132
A liberalized test under Section 165 for a loss deduction
using either of the "transaction" theories combined with cap-
italization in appropriate circumstances would appear to fulfill
the need for consistency without disturbing the traditional cur-
rent balance between deduction and capitalization. It also sen-
sibly reflects a largely unarticulated general policy which seems
to underlie opinions such as Primuth that taxpayers who have
a legitimate profit motive and incur expenses in seeking to gain
a profit-making position should not be denied a deduction from
ordinary income.
V. FACTORS TO CONSIDER IN A
PROFIT MOTIVE TEST
With respect to investigatory expenses, both the trade or
business test and the transaction for profit test are changing to
de-emphasize the presence of an ongoing operational activity or
132. For a suggestion that two such possibilities exist, see Morton
Frank, 20 T.C. 511, 514 (1953). A similar analysis is made in Fleischer,
The Tax Treatment of Expenses Incurred in Investigation for a Business
or Capital Investment, 14 TAx L. REv. 567, 597-98 (1959). See Champlain
Coach Lines, Inc. v. Commissioner, 138 F.2d 904 (2d Cir. 1943),
where two attempts in consecutive years to procure an intrastate bus
operation permit were treated as separate transactions. The Commis-
sioner had argued that all expenses should be capitalized, but the
court allowed the expenses of the first attempt to be deducted and
held that only those connected with the second permit acquisition at-
tempt, which was successful, were to be capitalized.
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interest and to examine more closely the individual's profit mo-
tive. Although there are restrictions in the statutory language
of Section 162 which confine deductions under that section to
those taxpayers asserting trade or business status, it is apparent
that the test is developing to give more weight to profit motive.
To the extent that Section 212 affords a taxpayer treatment par-
allel to Section 162 in many respects, and because of the close
relation of the provisions, profit motive will become more im-
portant to Section 212 treatment as well.133 Section 165(c)(2),
which appears to be the best approach to deductibility if reform
continues, would embody almost exclusively an express profit
motive test if the transaction aspect of its test is loosened ap-
preciably. Given these developments, it is important that guide-
lines be established to assure a consistent and accurate evalua-
tion of a taxpayer's motive for, and expectation of, future profit
when investigations are made.1
3 4
An investigatory expense test which looks wholly at profit
motive obviously requires an objective examination of the cir-
cumstances of the taxpayer's efforts in each case. A purely sub-
jective test of profit motive is unrealistic since it is clear that a
taxpayer's declarations of subjective intent will be self-serving,
and do not really permit any further analysis. Such a test has
been rejected in other areas of tax law.135
The first relevant factor in an objective test should be the
previous experience of the taxpayer. If he has qualifications,
133. For example, the analysis of profit motive in Rubin Hess, 30
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1043 (1971), appears to deal in part with Section 212
since language from that provision is repeated in the opinion. There the
taxpayer was denied a deduction of expenses for hair styling and a pro-
fessional wardrobe because she had no trade or business or existing
interest at the time of the expenditures although she had been a singer
in the past. In analyzing motive, the court stressed the objective facts
that the taxpayer had left the entertainer's union to which she had previ-
ously belonged and that she currently had no manager. The court
also mentioned that she might be merely seeking entertainment em-
ployment, in which case the expenses were preparatory to a business
and nondeductible.
134. In tests of profit motive under the Code the taxpayer is usually
required to have a substantial profit motive and a good faith expecta-
tion of profit. See 4A J. MERTEs, supra note 4, at § 25.08; Id. at vol. 5,
§§ 28.31, 28.34. It is less clear whether the taxpayer's expectation
need be a reasonable one when viewed objectively, but some cases have
held that it need not be. See Hirsch v. Commissioner, 315 F.2d 731
(9th Cir. 1963); DuPont v. United States, 234 F. Supp. 681 (D. Del.
1964).




training or business experience in the field in which he is incur-
ring search expenses, it should reflect favorably on his asserted
motive. A second factor is the character of the expense, that is,
whether it could be personal. For instance, expenses of a survey
or an economic report should be probative of honest profit mo-
tive because such expenses could not possibly be incurred for
personal reasons unless they are preliminary to the acquisition
of an asset not of a profit-making nature, such as a personal
residence. On the other hand, expenses for travel to Europe
to investigate a business asset should be subject to closer scrut-
iny since the trip could be partially or entirely for personal en-
joyment.
Another factor which might be given weight is actual profit
derived. If the taxpayer in fact has profited from the activity,
this, although not conclusive, should strongly indicate some in-
come-earning effort and motive. On the other hand, if the tax-
payer has profited only sporadically or not at all from occas-
sional activities in the past, it might indicate a lack of motive
although it is at least arguable that lack of success does not ac-
curately measure the motive or effort which may have been put
into the previous ventures. Also important is the amount of
time and money invested in the search by the taxpayer. For
instance, if he travels to Europe and spends only several days
out of a month visiting prospective business contacts, his motive
should be suspecte& However, if he spends all his time visiting
such contacts and also spends substantial sums on economic sur-
veys or advice, his motive probably is one of honest profit-
seeking.
A court's accurate judgment under all circumstances would
be served by requiring allocation and record keeping similar to
that required under the travel and entertainment business de-
duction provision.13s A recent memorandum decision' 37 ap-
plied such standards to business and nondeductible personal
expenses incurred on a trip to Europe. The taxpayer's trade or
business status was extended beyond the period of his prior em-
ployment and resulted in an allowable deduction of that portion
of his investigatory expenditures not attributed to personal pur-
136. See IRC, § 274(c), (d); Treas. Reg. § 1.274-4 (1963); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.274-5 (1962). These provisions require that an allocation be made
between business and personal expenses, with certain exceptions, for
travel outside the United States. More generally, a taxpayer attempting
to deduct travel, entertainment or gift expenses must keep adequate
records of amount, time, place and business relationship.
137. Walter Hendrix, 30 CCH Tax Ct. Mer. 221 (1971).
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suits. The Tax Court invoked the record keeping standards of
Section 274 and held that the deduction of some of the alleged
investigatory expenses must be denied because the taxpayer had
not adequately documented their business purpose. With such a
tool available to coerce taxpayers to provide documentary sub-
stantiation for alleged investigations, a court should have no
greater burden with investigatory expenses than is already in-
herent in determining the allowances of business entertainment
expenses. In fact, in the latter area of tax law, decisions may
be even more difficult because it is often an extremely narrow
line separating expenses which are business motivated and those
which are personally motivated.
A taxpayer who has outside income would have greater dif-
ficulty in establishing motive. For example, a taxpayer who
investigates farming, having no other source of income than
that expected from the venture, should have less difficulty in
establishing profit motive than a full-time corporate executive
who investigates a farm. In the latter case, there is a possibility
that the taxpayer will be investigating an "activity not engaged
in for profit" subject to the restrictions of Section 183 of the
code.138
138. IRC, § 183(a), (b), (c). Because of the wording of Section
183 (c), that "the 'term activity not engaged in for profit' means any
activity other than one with respect to which deductions are allowable
for the taxable year under section 162 or under paragraph (1) or (2)
of section 212" (emphasis added), it might appear that Section 183
picks up all expenses which do not quality for Section 162 or 212
treatment. However, the legislative intent and the service's interpreta-
tion of the statute reflect a special meaning in the word "activity"
which precludes investigatory expenses. That is, "activity" is an on-
going operational component similar to the operational component of the
Section 162 trade or business test. See Oshins, Proposed Regulations
Provide New Rules for the Hobby Loss Game, 35 J. OF TAXATION 214,
at 216-17 (1971).
Despite the fact that Section 183 apparently does not apply to
investigatory expenses, a profit motive test for investigatory expenses
may find relevant factors in the judicially and legislatively developed
tests under the provision. In this respect see Proposed Treas. Reg.
§ 1.183-2 P.H. Federal Taxes 65,371 (1972). There the determination
as to whether the taxpayer falls under the provision, such that his ex-
penses from the activity can generally only be deducted up to the
amount of his income from the activity, depends on various factors.
Among the factors listed are: the taxpayer's success at such pursued
activities in the past, the time and effort expended by the taxpayer,
the expertise and background of the taxpayer, or the fact that he has
consulted with an expert if it is a specialized pursuit. See generally
Oshins, supra; Sharpe, New "Hobby Loss" Rule is Tougher But "En-
gaged in For Profit" Dilemma Remains, 32 J. OF TAXATION 289 (1970).
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